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JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE 1983
AMENDMENTSTOTHEFEDERALCIVIL
RULES
Carl Tobias*

What if a federal district judge relied on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16 to require that the civil rights plaintiff whom you
represent participate in a summary jury trial which would jeopardize the plaintiff's case by revealing most of it to the defendant? Suppose that a trial court invoked the same Rule to instruct
an insurer that it must send to a settlement conference an officer
having authority to settle within a range which the judge
specified.
Imagine that, to win a lawsuit alleging deprivations of constitutional rights and to comply with Rule 11, you thoroughly
researched the law, developing creative legal theories which supported several counts of a complaint. Suppose that a district
court or a magistrate then strongly suggested during a pretrial
conference that you drop those counts, because the judicial official believed that the counts were frivolous.
What if a judge applied Rule 26 to substantially limit a plaintiff's discovery as unduly burdensome or expensive, considering
the litigant's resources or the relative insignificance of the case's
needs, the amount in controversy or the issues at stake? Suppose
that the court restricted discovery, even though the plaintiff had
limited access to, and money ·for assembling data in the files of
the defendant police department. This information was important
in proving the case, and the plaintiff sought to permanently enjoin employment practices that purportedly discriminated against
many workers. Moreover, what if the district judge or magistrate
actually imposed, or threatened to levy, sanctions as onerous as
attorneys' fees for failure to comply with his or her demands or
suggestions?
Judicial officers have taken all of these actions, and numerous
• Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Hesse and Peggy
Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer, Charlotte Wilmerton and Beverly Stevenson for processing this Article, and the Harris Trust and· 'the University of Montana for
generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
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similar actions, pursuant to the 1983 amendments to Rules 11, 16
and 26. The actions are memorialized in many written determinations. A number of these cases have not been appealed and few of
those appealed have been reversed, principally because circuit
courts have deferentially reviewed this district court
decisionmaking.
If the trial judges and magistrates have committed such expansive exercises of discretion to writing, consider what actions they
might be taking inforinally. Indeed, substantial anecdotal evidence suggests that the officials have wielded even broader discretion informally; they are less likely to be challenged or to be
held accountable in that context. Most importantly, the type of
enforcement described above has disadvantaged many parties,
particularly civil rights plaintiffs, whose active participation in
federal civil litigation Congress specifically intended to facilitate.
It is extremely difficult to document the prevalence of this activity among federal judges and magistrates. Nonetheless, the
conduct appears· sufficiently widespread to warrant scrutiny,
sounding a cautionary note, and recommending certain changes in
the Rules and in their application. When the Advisory Committee
on the Civil Rules announced in August, 1990, that it would consider revising the 1983 amendments during 1991, consideration of
judicial enforcement of those provisions and their possible revi·
sion became imperative.
The first section of this Article briefly describes the developments which created the perception that the federal courts were
experiencing a litigation explosion and which ultimately led to
the promulgation of the 1983 amendments as one response to the
perceived explosion. It also examines the substantive content of
those changes, especially how the revisions enlarged federal judicial discretion. The second section evaluates the courts' implementation of the 1983 amendments and finds that this application has adversely affected numerous litigants, particularly civil
rights plaintiffs, while providing some benefits, namely fostering
more expeditious dispute resolution.
The third section provides suggestions for the future. Considerable data show that the enforcement of Rule 11 has disadvantaged and chilled the enthusiasm of civil rights plaintiffs and has
similarly affected many other litigants. Application of Rule 11 has
concomitantly harmed the civil justice system by, for instance,
generating extensive, and expensive, satellite litigation. Because
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these problems outweigh the benefits of the Rule's enforcement,
Congress and the Supreme Court should repeal or amend the provision promptly.
Analogous difficulties apparently have attended implementation of Rules 16 and 26, although the comparative dearth of information on their application complicates accurate assessment. Judicial invocation of the two Rules' sanctioning provisions seems
sufficiently troubling to warrant immediate revision. Enforcement
of the remaining subdivisions of Rules 16 and 26, which were
modified in 1983, apparently has offered certain advantages, such
as promoting more efficient disposition of lawsuits. Evaluators
should analyze their implementation to ascertain whether those
benefits are greater than the disadvantages for civil rights plaintiffs, additional parties and the civil litigation process. If they are
not, Congress and the Court should amend these provisions as
well.
·
I.

THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION AND THE' 1983 AMENDMENTS

The federal judiciary, led by Chief Justice Warren Burger, and
certain commentators began insisting in the mid-1970's that the
federal courts were experiencing a litigation explosion. 1 The
judges and writers argued that there was an increasing quantity
of federal civil litigation, too much of which was frivolous or pursued for purposes other than securing decisions on the merits. 2
One important source of difficulty was said to be the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, because their provisions for flexible
pleading, broad discovery, and substantial party and lawyer control of lawsuits enabled attorneys and their clients to abuse the
litigation process by; for example, exploiting existing procedural
mechanisms for strategic advantage. 3 Some observers contended
that ce!tain types of lawsuits, especially pro se civil rights cases,
1. I rely most in this section on Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 287-96 (1989). For examples of Chief Justice
Burger's views, see Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation,
in THE Pou.ND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 23 (A. Levin & R.
Wheeler eds. 1979); Burger Says Vacancies Add to "Judicial Deficit," N.Y. Times, Dec.
30, 1985, at 14, col. Al (urging the frequent imposition of sanctions); cf. Tobias, supra, at

287-88 (examples of commentators).
2. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442,U.S. 330, 345 (1979).
.
3. See Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 433, 440-43 (1986); Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or
Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1984).
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contributed substantially to mounting caseloads and that a disproportionate number of the lawsuits were frivolous.•
Most of these propositions were, and continue to be, controversial. For instance, it is very difficult to define what constitutes a
"litigation explosion" or "litigation abuse," much less to prove
that there was an explosion or to pinpoint the quantity of abuse. 11
Notwithstanding these problems, including a nearly complete
dearth of data, the Supreme Court, at the instigation of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, recommended the adoption of
sweeping amendments to Federal Rules 11, 16 and 26. 6 Congress
acquiesced in the Supreme Court's proposals, in part because it
was unclear at the time that the revisions' judicial application
would disadvantage litigants whose participation Congress meant
to foster, and the changes became effective in August, 1983.7
The drafters intended that the revisions transform the process
of federal civil litigation. 8 The amendments imposed significant,
new responsibilities on parties and lawyers, while the modifications gave district judges substantially more control over litigation and greatly enhanced the discretion that they could exercise.
Rule 16 had not been revised since 1938, when the Federal
Rules were initially adopted. 9 Because the original Rule 16 tersely
provided for many changes that had occurred in federal civil liti4. See, e.g., Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.
1984); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976); Valley v. Maule,
297 F. Supp. 958, 960 (D. Conn. 1968). But see Rotolo, 532 F.2d at 927 (Gibbons, J., concurring and dissenting) (civil rights cases not disproportionately frivolous); Eisenberg &
Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 642-43
(1987) (image of civil rights litigation explosion overstated and borders on myth).
5. For much of the relevant literature and attempts to resolve certain aspects of the
controversy, see Tobias, supra note 1, at 288-89 and sources cited therein; Tobias, Rule 1 I
and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 485, 522-23 (1988-89). Cf. Miller, supra
note 3, at 5 (25-fold increase in civil rights cases between 1960 and 1972 attributable to
Congress' passage of civil rights and voting rights statutes).
6. See Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of
Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927-28 (1989); Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2198-2202 (1989).
7. See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983). See
. generally A. MILLER, THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (1984). Because
Rule 7's revision simply subjects motions to Rule 11 's requirements, it is treated here in
conjunction with Rule 11.
8. See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1011-13 (1st
Cir. 1988); A. MILLER, supra note 7; Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67
A.B.A. J. 1648, 1650-52 (1981).
9. See Advisory Comm. Note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 205 (1983); see also FED. R. C1v. P. 16.
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gation, the revisors comprehensively rewrote and expanded the
Rule to respond to the challenges which modern litigation
presents. 10 The alterations in Rule 16 emphasized the importance
of pretrial conferences and the increased ability of courts to manage the pretrial phase. 11 One means of achieving these ob]ectives
was to require that judges issue scheduling orders, an innovation
which the Advisory Committee characterized as the "most significant change in Rule 16."12 Another mechanism for stressing the
importance of pretrial conferences and for enhancing judicial
management during the pretrial stage was prescribing the imposition of sanctions for violations of the Rule's terms, a provision not
included in the original Rule 16. 13
10. See Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 9, at 206-07. The magnitude of the revisions
in Rules 11, 16 and 26 precludes their reproduction in full here. Nevertheless, those provisions of the revisions that are most important to this paper are reproduced. For a convenient source which includes the Advisory Committee Notes and facilitates comparison of
the Rules prior to 1983 and the 1983 amendments, see id. at 165-220.
11. See FED. R. C1v. P. 16; Tobias, supra note 1, at 292. See generally A. MILLER, supra
note 7.
12. Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 9, at 207. Rule 16(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) SCHEDULING AND PLANNING. [T]he judge ... shall, after consulting
with the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties . . . enter a
scheduling order that limits the time
(1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings;
(2) to file and hear motions; and
(3) to complete discovery.
The scheduling order also may include
(4) the date or dates for conferences before trial, a final pretrial conference,
and trial; and
(5) any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
The order shall issue as soon as practicable but in no event more than 120 days
after filing of the complaint. A schedule shall not be modified except by leave of
the judge . . . upon a showing of good cause.
FED. R. C1v. P. 16(b).
13. See Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 9, at 213. Rule 16(f) provides:
(f) SANCTIONS. If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or
pretrial order, or if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling
or pretrial conference, or if a party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a party or party's attorney fails to
participate in good faith, the judge, upon motion or the judge's own initiative,
may make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others any of
the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in addition to any
other sanction, the judge shall require the party or the attorney representing the
party or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney's fees, unless the judge finds that the
noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust.
FED. R. C1v. P. 16(f).
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The revisors treated problems of excessive discovery and resistance to, or evasion of, reasonable discovery requests by modifying Rule 26 so as to accord judges more control over the discovery
process. 14 Courts must restrict discovery if they find that the discovery sought is unreasonably duplicative or cumulative or could
be secured more easily from other sources. 111 Judges also are to
limit discovery when they determine that the party seeking it
"has had ample opportunity" to acquire the information, or if the
discovery is unduly expensive or burdensome considering the
case's needs, the amount in dispute, restrictions on the litigants'
resources, and the significance of the iss.ues at stake in the
lawsuit. 16
Rule 26(g) requires that judges s~nction parties or attorneys
whose discovery requests, responses or objections are not preceded by reasonable prefiling inquiries into their factual or legal
bases or are filed for improper purposes. 17 The Rule also demands
14. See Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 9, at 216-17; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a),
(b), (g). See generally Tobias, supra note 1, at 292.
15. Rule 26(b) provides in pertinent part:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in subdivision
(a) [including depositions, interrogatories, document production, physical and
mental examinations and requests for admissions] shall be limited by the court
if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive . . . .
FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b).
16. Rule 26(b) provides in pertinent part:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in subdivision
(a) [including depositions, interrogatories, document production, physical and
mental examinations and requests for admissions] shall be limited by the court
if it determines that: ... (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the
discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of
the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and
the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.
Id.
17. Rule 26(g) provides in pertinent part:
.
(g) SIGNING OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS, RESPONSES, AND OBJECTIONS. Every request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record .... A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the request,
response, or objection and state the party's address. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that the signer has read the request, response, or objection, and that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information,
and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules
and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose;
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that courts sanction litigants or lawyers who submit discovery requests, responses or objections which are unreasonable or unduly
expensive or burdensome in light of the needs of the lawsuit,
prior discovery, the amount in controversy and the importance of
the questions at issue in the case. 18 Amended Rule 11 similarly
mandates that judges sanction parties or attorneys who fail to
conduct reasonable inquiries before filing pleadings, motions or
other papers or submit them for improper purposes. 19
II.

JUDICIAL APPLICATION

A substantial number of lower federal courts have broadly exercised the increased discretion that the 1983 amendments afford
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary. delay or needless increase in the .cost
of litigation . . . .
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification,
_the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or both,
an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. 26(g).
This language is very similar to that of Rule 11. See infra note 19.
18. Rule 26(g) provides in pertinent part:
[The signature] constitutes a certification that the signer has read the request,
response, or objection, and that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is: . . . (3) not unreasonable
or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery
already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the
issues at stake in the litigation.
FED. R. C1v. P. 26(g).
This language is very similar to that of subsection (b) of the Rule. See supra note 16.
19. Rule 11 provides in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer
that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of
the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry
it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is
not interposed for any improper purpose . . . . If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.

.

R. Ctv. P. 11. Although the overall effect of the 1983 amendments is to expand judicial discretion, certain provisions, such as the mandatory sanctioning requirements of
Rules 11 and 26, actually limit that discretion.
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them. Some judges have applied the revisions in ways which constituted abuses of this discretion and clearly disadvantaged numerous litigants, especially parties who were actively involved in
public law litigation, such as civil rights plaintiffs. ·

A. Formal Activity Involving the 1983 Amendments
1.

Rule 11

Numerous federal courts have vigorously enforced .amended
Rule 11 against civil rights plaintiffs. 20 District judges have found
these plaintiffs in violation of the Rule's reasonable prefiling inquiry requirements more frequently than any other type of litigant. 21 The Seventh Circuit and a number of district courts
within its geographic purview have displayed considerable willingness to apply Rule 11 aggressively against civil rights plaintiffs.
For example, one Seventh Circuit panel required five turgid
paragraphs to demonstrate that the legal theories which a civil
rights plaintiff asserted were "wacky,"22 thus enabling the court
to affirm the trial judge's dete.rmination that the plaintiffs pleadings were not grounded in law. 23 Another Seventh Circuit panel ·
upheld a district court's finding that a civil rights plaintiff had
conducted a deficient prefiling factual investigation even when
the plaintiff could only have secured the information needed for
Rule 11 compliance through discovery. 24 Numerous, additional
courts have decided that plaintiffs contravened the Rule in civil
rights cases which were "close" legally or factually. 211
Some judges have implemented the mandatory duty to levy appropriate sanctions for Rule 11 violations by exercising their discretion to impose substantial monetary assessments on civil rights
20. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 303-04; Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D.
189, 205, 217 (1988).
21. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 490; Vairo, supra note 20, at 200-01.
22. Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Cudahy J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
23. Id. at 1083-85.
24. See Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194, 205-06 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'g 596
F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
25. See Vairo, supra note 20, at 217; see, e.g., Jennings v. Joshua Indep. School Dist.,
869 F.2d 870, 878-79, opinion amended and superseded, 877 F.2d 313, 320-21 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3212 (1990); Goldberg v. Weil, 707 F. Supp. 357, 362 (N.D.
Ill. 1989). A number of cases also do not appear to be close. See Vairo, supra note 20, at
217; see, e.g., Bogney v. Jones, 904 F.2d 272, 274 (5th Cir. 1990).
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plaintiffs. 36 Courts have levied large financial sanctions, notwithstanding the availability of a broad array of other possible sanctions ranging from reprimands to attorneys' fees. 27 For instance, a
public interest organization is currently appealing a $1,000,000
sanction. H Different district courts in the Eastern District of
North Carolina recently awarded more than $80,000 against lawyers for civil rights plaintiffs in separate controversial cases. 29 In.deed, monetary assessments, often of attorneys' fees, remain the
"sanction of choice. " 30
Moreover, the Supreme Court recently held that "an appellate
court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing
all aspects of a district court's Rule 11 determinations." 31 Adoption of this very deferential standard enhances the already substantial discretion of trial judges as first tier decision-makers. 32
Circuit courts applying this standard will not closely analyze any
dimension of district court Rule 11 jurisprudence; the resulting
deference to first-tier decision-makers is evident in recent appellate decisions regarding the Rule. For example, during September, 1990, two Fourth Circuit panels failed to scrutinize, and upheld, trial court determinations that plaintiffs' attorneys had
violated Rule 11 in controversial civil rights cases. 33
26. For the relevant la~guage of Rule 11, see supra note 19.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 119-21.
28. See Avirgan v.. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544, order clarified by 125 F.R.D. 189 (S.D. Fla.),
appeal filed, No. 89-5515 (11th Cir. 1989).
29. See Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1384-93 (E.D.N.C. 1987) ($84,000 sanction
levied in employment discrimination litigation), vacated in part on reconsideration, 123
F.R.D. 204 (E.D.N.C. 1988), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part sub nom. Blue v.
United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W.
3701 (1991); Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt, 132 F.R.D. 650 (E.D.N.C. 1989) ($122,834
sanction imposed in civil rights litigation involving Native Americans and African Americans in Robeson County), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part sub nom. In re
Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3702 (1991). The attorneys probably will be unable to convince the district judges to reduce the sanctions
substantially.
30. See Tobias, Reassessing Rule 1J and Civil Rights Cases, 33 How. L.J. 161, 170
(1990); Tobias, supra note 5, at 501. The Federal Judicial Center, in its preliminary analysis of data on Rule 11 activity since 1987 in five district courts which have fully computerized docket information, found that the percentage of rulings that awarded fees to opposing parties ranged from a low of 70% to a high of 93%. PRELIMINARY REPORT ON RULE 11,
at 11 (Feb. 27, 1991) ("Summary of Rule 11 Field Study Reports").
31. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990).
32. See Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837 (1984) (comprehensive analysis of increasing appellate court deference to first tier decisionmakers).
33. See In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 525; Blue, 914 F.2d at 547-48; see also White v.
General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 683 (10th Cir. 1990).
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Judicial decisions finding that civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers
had contravened the Rule and the resultant imposition of sanctions have had deleterious implications for many of these parties
and practitioners, whose lack of resources leave them especially
vulnerable to chilling. These litigants, other parties, and the civil
justice system have· also been detrimentally affected by the inconsistent judicial application of Rule 11 and by the expensive satellite litigation that the provision has engendered. For instance, two.
respected members of the Maine bar recently spent thousands of
dollars appealing a $250 sanction to protect their reputations and
as a "matter of principle" in an environmental case. 34 The First
Circuit affirmed the lower court ruling, although the appellate
panel admitted that the case was close. n
2. Rule 16
The federal judiciary's enforcement of revised Rule 16 appears
to have created equally problematic difficulties. Numerous district courts have required that litigants participate in summary
jury trials. 38 These are half-day proceedings in which counsel for
each side have one hour to present "opening and closing arguments [that] are amalgamated with a narrative overview of the
trial proofs." 37 The six-person jury hears the presentations, receives a brief charge from the judge and renders a nonbinding
verdict which is used to facilitate settlement. 38 Trial judges have
demanded the involvement of parties in summary jury trials, despite both increasing criticism of district court authority to compel participation and growing doubt about the efficacy of such
trials.
For example, a trial judge recently stated that the summary
34. See Maine Audubon Soc'y v. Purslow, 907 F.2d 265, 266 (1st Cir. 1990). See generally Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, at 8, 18 (1991) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
35. See Purslow, 907 F.2d at 266, 269.
36. See, e.g., Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Century Bank, 695 F. Supp. 1343,
1347 n.3 (D. Mass. 1988); Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 606
(D. Minn. 1988); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 44-46 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988). Cf. Cincinnati Gas &
Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Cincinnati Post v. General Elec. Co., 489 U.S. 1033 (1989) (first amendment right of public access does not apply to summary jury trials).
37. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute
·
Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461, 471 (1984).
38. See id. at 470-71.
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jury trial procedure is not authorized by Congress and that federal courts lack power to summon jurors who function as settlement advisors. 39 The judge also questioned the effectiveness of
the mechanism because its non-binding character '~presents great
temptation to strategically withhold crucial evidence and argument [and because] when forced, a party might view. it as an unacceptable burden or bludgeon.'"' 0 Judge Posner similarly observed that he could "find nothing .in Rule 16 (pretrial
conferences) to suggest that judges are authorized to convene juries to assist in settlement" and expressed doubt that Congress
had empowered courts to empanel summary jurors.• 1 Judge Posner also suggested that summary jury trials might compromise
the integrity of the jury system and that the results of his admittedly "crude study" failed to "support a conclusion that the summary jury trial increases judicial efficiency.''n Professor Wiegand
recently found that the procedure was ineffective, principally because its "verdicts do not always reliably indicate what a regular
jury would determine"' 3 and the technique generally fails to produce settlement efficaciously."
Moreover, mandated summary jury trials disproportionately
disadvantage plaintiffs. If a plaintiff participates, that party will
be harmed more than the defendant by the revelation of its case
during the summary trial."' Thus, plaintiffs have stronger reason
not tO participate; however, if they refuse to participate courts
may be unreceptive to their substantive claims or may sanction
them.
Indeed, one district court held a lawyer in criminal contempt
for refusing to submit his client's civil rights case to a summary
39. Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 508, 510 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
40. Id. at 508 n.3. See also Comment, Mandatory Summary Jury Trials: Playing by the
Rules?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1495 (1989) (criticism of authority and doubt about efficacy).
41. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 385-86 (1986) (doubt about
efficacy).
42. Id. at 382.
43. Wiegland, A New Light ·Bulb or the Work of the Devil? A Current Assessment of
Summary Jury Trials, 69 OR. L. REV. 87; 100 (1990).
44. Id. at 103. But see Note, Rule 16 and Pretrial Conferences: Have We Forgotten the
Most Important Ingredient?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1449 (1990) (defense of technique).
45. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333, 334-35 (C.D. Ill.), vacated, 830
F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987), as amended, 838 F.2d 884 (1988). See generally Maatman, The
Future of Summary Jury Trials in Federal Courts: Strandell v. Jackson County, 21 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 455 (1988).
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jury trial. A panel of the Seventh Circuit properly determined
that Rule 16 does not authorize compulsory summary jury trials ·
and that their use as a pretrial settlement technique would seriously threaten the well-established requirements governing discovery and the work-product privilege.' 8 The Seventh Circuit is
the only appellate court which has so found, and "no one knows
exactly how many judges mandate such a procedure, nor how, nor
when.""
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit, en bane, recently held that a
trial court could order a corporate officer with settlement authority to attend a settlement conference and might sanction the corporation, which was represented by counsel, for not complying
even though the company clearly stated that it would not settle
and Rule 16 only prescribes the attendance of counsel and unrepresented parties. 48 One trial court even informed an insurer's attorney that the corporation was "not to send some flunky who
has no authority to negotiate [to a settlement conference but
rather] someone who can enter into a settlement in [a certain]
range without having to call anyone else"; when the company refused, the judge struck its pleadings while permitting the insurer
to "purge itself of contempt" with a public apology. 49 Numerous
additional trial courts have similarly invoked Rule 16 to pressure
litigants or lawyers to settle their cases, while several circuits
have felt compelled to admonish some of the district judges that
the Rule "was not designed as a means for clubbing the parties
46. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886-88 (7th Cir. 1988); see also
Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 510 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (only Congress by
enactment may compel individuals to serve as summary jurors); United States v. Exum,
744 F. Supp. 803, 805 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (same).
47. Wiegand, supra note 43, at 114. Cf. Caldwell v. Ohio Power Co., 710 F. Supp. 194,
202 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (summary jury trial conducted as part of case's routine pretrial
processing); Lambros, The Federal Rules of Ciuil Procedure: A New Adversarial Model
for a New Era, 50 U. PI'IT. L. REV. 789, 802 (1989) (estimating that 100 federal and state
judges have used summary jury trials in more than 1000 cases); Maatman, supra note 45,
at 457 (estimating that more than 65 federal judges had employed the process as of 1988);
Comment, Compelled Participation in Innouatiue Pretrial Proceedings, 84 Nw. U.L. REV.
290, 309 (1989) (federal courts across nation order summary jury trials).
48. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 656-57 (7th Cir. 1989).
See also Dvorak v. Shibata, 123 F.R.D. 608 (D. Neb. 1988); In re Air Crash Disaster at
Stapleton Int'! Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1433 (D. Colo. 1988); Abney v. Patten, 696 F. Supp.
567 (W.D. Okla. 1987). See generally Comment, supra note 40, at 1510-13. For a recent
example of apparently appropriate sanctioning under Rule 16 in a civil rights case, see
John v. Louisiana, 899 F.2d 1441, 1448-49 (5th Cir. 1990).
49. Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44, 45-46 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
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... into an involuntary compromise,"110 as the Advisory Committee Note accompanying amended Rule 16 explicitly provides. 61
An increasing number of trial courts have exercised their discretion under Rule 16 in civil rights and employment discrimination ·litigation to levy the ultimate sanction of dismissing the
plaintiffs' cases. 62 Although nearly all of the lawsuits involved infractions by attorneys of requirements governing pretrial conferences, relatively few appellate courts have found that the dismissals of the parties' claims constituted abuses of discretion.
Illustrative is an employment discrimination action in which
the district judge relied principally on Rule 16(f) to dismiss plaintiffs case with prejudice. 6 3 The court dismissed the litigant's
claim, finding that her counsel failed to comply with a pretrial
order which required that both parties file comprehensive information with the court before trial. 11" The Ninth Circuit determined that the dismissal was not an abuse of discretion, because
refusal to comply with the order delayed the lawsuit's expeditious
resolution, impaired the trial court's management of its docket,
and prejudiced defendant and that the district judge had considered less drastic sanctions. 6 6 Moreover, the panel rejected the argument of plaintiffs counsel that she was not obligated to comply
with the pretrial order because it was invalid, describing the order
50. Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985). Accord Newton v. A.C.& S., Inc.,
918 F.2d 1121, 1128-29 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Ashcroft, 888 F.2d 546, 547 (8th Cir. 1989);
Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887; see also Hess v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 846 F.2d
114, 116 (2d Cir. 1988); Abney v. Patten, 696 F. Supp. 567, 568 (W.D. Okla. 1987); cf.
National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 844 F.2d 216,
222-23 (5th Cir. 1988) (failure to compromise case even pursuant to terms suggested by
court is not grounds for sanctions). See generally P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL
(1986).
51. "It is not the purpose of Rule 16(b)(7) to impose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants." Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 9, at 210.
52. See, e.g., Dukes v. Ward, 129 F.R.D. 478, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). District court dismissal orders were upheld in both Thompson v. Housing Auth., 782 F.2d 829 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986), and Callip v. Harris County Child Welfare Dep't, 757 F.2d
1513, 1522 (5th Cir. 1985).
53. See Malone v. United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 819 (1988).
54. Id. at 129-30.
55. Id. at 131-33. The Ninth Circuit, thus, considered four of the five factors that courts
are to examine in deciding whether. to dismiss a claim for non-compliance with a court
order. Id. at 130. The Ninth Circuit failed to discuss the fifth factor, the public policy
which favors merits-based disposition of litigation, because the factor did not outweigh the
others, even though it weighed against dismissal. Id. at 133 n.2.
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as a legitimate mechanism for· improving court efficiency. 116 The
circuit court also concluded that the district judge had not abused
his discretion by refusing to excuse plaintiff for her lawyer's omission, in light of the egregious character of the attorney's malfeasance.117 One member of the panel dissented, however, stating that
the sanction of dismissal was harsh and improperly imposed in
this instance. 118 The dissent believed that dismissal was inappropriate, because merit-based dispositions should be promoted, particularly when, in the dissent's opinion, the trial court had neither
considered the feasibility of levying less extreme sanctions nor
warned plaintiffs of the impending dismissal. 119
3. Rule 26
Judges have taken formal action less frequently under amended
Rule 26 than revised Rule 11 or amended Rule 16. Indeed, the
Advisory Committee, in its August 1990 announcement, observed
that sanction provisions adopted in 1983 have been employed
principally in "connection with alleged pleading abuses," even
though the 1983 drafters and the American Bar Association "were
at least as concerned with discovery abuses."60 The Committee
56. Id. at 133-34.
57. Id. at 134.
58. Id. at 134 (Tang, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 134-35 (Tang, J., dissenting). The dissent disagreed with the majority's assertion that certain actions of the trial judge "were attempts at less drastic alternatives," id.
at 134, and emphasized the fifth factor, which the majority did not discuss. See supra note
55. Additional examples of cases not finding abuses of discretion are Ikerd v. Lacy, 852
F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1988); Brinkmann v. Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 749-57 (5th Cir.
1987). But see John v. State of Louisiana, 828 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1987) (reversing dismis·
sal with prejudice under Rule 16 because no clear record of delay or contumaci~us conduct
and lesser sanctions would have been fairer); Salahuddin v. Harris, 782 F.2d 1127, 1133
(2d Cir. 1986) (failure to obey "implied" pretrial order does not justify sanctipns under
Rule 16(f)); Williams v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 789 F.2d 881, 883 (11th Cir.
1986) (reversing district judge's reliance on Rule 16 to dismiss case considered meritless).
My primary concerns are that the lawyers' mistakes not be visited on the clients and that
prose litigants not be disadvantaged unduly. Cf. Woodmore v. Git-N-Go, 790 F.2d 1497,
1498-99 (10th Cir. 1986) (punishment must be imposed on person at fault): Some courts
are sensitive to these concerns; they may impose monetary sanctions only on the attorney
or dismiss without prejudice or affirm such disposition on appeal. See, e.g., Ikerd, 852 F.2d
at 1258; Dukes v. Ward, 129 F.R.D. 478, 482 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
60. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Call For Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Ciuil Procedure and Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 344, 345 (1990) [hereinafter Call for Comments].
Although the Advisory Committee's announcement spoke of the 1983 amendments, it did
not mention Rule 16 specifically ..
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speculated that the problem of discovery abuse may have been
overstated or been rectified by Rule 26(g)'s prophylactic effect or
that the bar has yet to realize the Rule's potential. 61 Another apparent explanation for the comparative dearth of formal Rule 26
activity is that lawyers are accustomed to resolving many discovery disputes with additional discovery rules, such as Rule 37. A
number of discovery controversies under Rule 26 also may have
been so insignificant that they did not warrant resolution in writing, much less in reported opinions.
It is difficult to glean an accurate "feel" for the facts of those
Rule 26 discovery disputes which courts have resolved in writing.
Furthermore, many federal judges apparently remain committed
to the idea-reflected in the 1938 Federal Rules and in numerous
substantive statutes-that discovery should be rather freely permitted, especially in civil rights and employment discrimination
litigation. 62 These factors complicate the assessment of formal
Rule 26 decisionmaking. Courts have, however, taken some relevant action pursuant to Rule 26 or in conjunction with Rules 11
or 16.
The First Circuit has upheld the exercise of broad district court
discretion to enter "case management orders" under Rules 16 and
26 in a ~ase involving a large number of parties. 63 The appellate
court approved the trial court's finding that the need to manage
complex litigation efficaciously overrode the claims of the plaintiffs' attorneys to privacy under the work product doctrine. 64
There also have been some close cases in which district courts
denied the discovery requests of civil rights plaintiffs or appellate
courts deferred to those decisions. For instance, in an employment discrimination suit, the magistrate and the trial judge determined that plaintiffs interrogatories were overbroad and unduly
burdensome under Rule 26(b)(l). 611 The Fjrst Circuit, stating that
it would intervene only if plaintiff clearly demonstrated that the
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Orbovich v. Macalester College, 119 F.R.D. 411, 412, 416 (D. Minn. 1988);
Youngblood v. Gates, 112 F.R.D. 342, 344, 348 (C.D. Cal. 1985). See generally Subrin, How
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 922 (1987) (Federal Rules exceeded even equity's significant permissiveness and flexibility in discovery); Tobias, supra note 1, at 284-85 (substantive statutes).
63. In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1013 (1st Cir. 1988).
64. Id. at 1013-21.
65. See Mack v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 186 (1st Cir. 1989).
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district court's discovery ruling was "plainly wrong and resulted
in substantial prejudice,'' ruled that plaintiff had shown no abuse
of discretion. 88 Nonetheless, the panel remarked that the trial
"court could possibly have allowed [plaintiff's interrogatories],
but it was certainly free to call the shot the other way,'' while
making several similar observations which indicated that the case
was close. 87
4. Inherent Judicial Authority
Some judges apparently believe that their considerable discretion, even as substantially enhanced by the 1983 amendments, remains inadequate, especially to remedy the litigation explosion.
Courts, thus, have found additional ways of augmenting that discretion. The quintessential example of the phenomenon is the
ever-broadening ambit that courts have claimed for the exercise
of inherent judicial authority. 88
Inherent judicial authority is power that the Constitution, statutes and Federal Rules do not specifically provide courts; it is
authority which is implied or is required to effectuate those powers expressly prescribed or the power necessary for a court to
function as a court. 89 The authority traditionally was considered
to be quite narrow, and the Supreme Court stated as recently as
1980 that "[b]ecause inherent powers are shielded from direct
democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and
66. Id.
67. Id. at 187. "[I]t seems to us that the interrogatories at best fell into, and quite probably beyond, the gray area at th.e discovery margin." Id. Other examples of cases that seem
close are Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 379-81 (1st Cir. 1989) and Gomez v. City of
Nashau, 126 F.R.D. 432, 434-37 (D.N.H. 1989).
When resolving discovery controversies, numerous trial judges have struck a fair balance
between the interests of civil rights plaintiffs and defendants. See, e.g., Dinkins v. Ohio,
116 F.R.D. 270, 272-74 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Burke v. New York City Police Dep't, 115 F.R.D.
220 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Moreover, a few courts have been sensitive to the litigants' resource
disparities. See, e.g., Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 464 (D. Utah 1985) (denying
defendant's motion for discovery costs); Wigler v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 108 F.R.D.
204, 206 (D. Md. 1985) (defendant's requests for admissions imposed undue burden on
plaintiff, considering "circumstances of this single-plaintiff employment discrimination
case"); see also Isaac v. Harvard Univ., 769 F.2d 817, 828 (1st Cir. 1985).
68. See generally Comment, supra note 40, at 1510-13.
69. This description is derived from three circuit court opinions that comprehensively
discuss the concept. See Nasco, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, 894 F.2d 696, 702-06
(5th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 38 (1990); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Co., 871 F.2d 648, 650-53 (7th Cir. 1989); Eash v. Riggins
Trucking Co., 757 F.2d 557, 561-64 (3d Cir. 1985).
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discretion. " 70
Nevertheless, the federal judiciary, especially since the mid1980's, has increasingly relied upon this essentially uncabined
power when applying the 1983 amendments, other Federal Rules,
and additional procedural provisions to enlarge its discretion.
Most of the courts that decided the cases analyzed in the subsection on Rule 16's enforcement also invoked inherent judicial authority. For example, many of the judges who relied on Rule 16 to
mandate summary jury trials 71 or to dismiss plaintiffs' cases 72
premised their determinations on inherent power as well. Moreover, some courts have relied on inherent authority to assess the
costs of empaneling juries against litigants that settled cases on
the eve of trial. 73
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently accorded the inherent
power doctrine one of its broadest articulations in Hoffman-La
Roche v. Sperling. 74 The Court,' proclaiming that "courts traditionally have exercised considerable authority to manage their
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious resolution
of cases"711 extended the reach of the inherent powers concept further than in earlier cases. 76 The Court recognized that inherent
authority reinforced Rule 83's endorsement of district court
power to facilitate the provision of notice in cases with numerous
potential plaintiffs, where written consent is statutorily required
for multiple plaintiffs to join in one suit. 77
70. Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980).
71. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 604 (D.
Minn. 1988); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
72. See, e.g., Thompson v. Housing Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 829 (1986); Callip v. Harris County Child Welfare Dep't, 757 F.2d 1513, 1518 (5th Cir.
1985).
73. See, e.g., White v. Raymark Indus., 783 F.2d 1175 (4th Cir. 1986); Eash v. Riggins
Trucking Co., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985).
74. 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989).
75. Id. at 487 (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).
76. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 69.
77. See Sperling, 110 S. Ct. at 487; see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988). The majority's invocation of inherent authority in Sperling appears to be dicta and may be limited. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia's stinging dissent, essentially accusing the majority of exceeding constitutional bounds, does not leave that impression. See Sperling, 110 S. Ct. at 488-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court may
extend the inherent powers idea further when it decides Nasco. See Nasco, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, 894 F.2d 696, 702-06 (5th Cir.)', cert. granted sub nom. Chambers
v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 38 (1990); see also Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922, 935, 940-42 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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B. Informal Activity Involving the 1983 Amendments
There is considerable and increasing evidence of informal activity involving the 1983 amendments that has disadvantaged many
litigants, particularly those whose active participation in lawsuits
Congress intended to encourage. For instance, judges have
threatened to impose Rule 11 sanctions on civil rights parties and
lawyers who refused to withdraw counts that the courts believed
were frivolous or have levied large assessments in unpublished
opinions. 78 There have been analogous threats under Rule 16
where parties or attorneys display~d reluctance to participate in
certain forms of alternative dispute resolution, such as summary
jury trials. 79 Judges have lodged similar threats when they
thought that the litigants or their counsel had not made good
faith efforts to settle cases or that lawyers were inadequately prepared for pretrial conferences. 8 ° Courts also have relied on Rule
26 to pressure litigants and practitioners who filed discovery papers that judges deemed 'inappropriate. 81
This anecdotal evidence comports with reasonable inferences
that may be drawn from formal judicial decisionmaking under the
1983 amendments. If courts, in print, have enforced the Rules so
broadly and have exercised such expansive discretion, they would
be more likely to do so in informal settings, because the prospects
for being questioned or being held accountable are significantly
diminished. 82 Thus, the informal application of the amendments
and the informal exercise of judicial discretion may well be· more
·
problematic than their formal counterparts.

78. See Tobias, Recalibrating Rule 11 in Ciuil Rights Litigation, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105,
117 (1991) (threats); Tobias, supra note 5, at 501-02, 505-06 (same); Tobias, supra note 34,
at 10 n.61 (same). Cf. A. MILLER, supra note 7, at 38 (discovery sanctions frequently
unrep~rted).
79. These ideas are premised on conversations with lawyers who represent public interest litigants and civil rights plaintiffs. See generally supra text accompanying notes 36-47.
80. These ideas are premised on conversations with lawyers who represent public interest litigants and civil rights plaintiffs. See generally supra notes 48-70 and accompanying
text.
81. These ideas are premised on conversations with litigants and lawyers who pursue
public interest and civil rights litigation.
82. By this, I mean that the possibilities. for abuse in informal settings seem substantially greater because of the lack of accountability that published decisionmaking in some
measure provides.
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C. Implications

The judicial activity analyzed above has had numerous important consequences. It apparently has dampened the enthusiasm of
public interest litigants and attorneys, particularly civil rights
plaintiffs and practitioners.Ba These parties and lawyers have experienced chilling effects primarily because their relative lack of
power and resources makes them risk averse.B" This phenomenon
is especially troubling. Congress has clearly stated in much substantive, procedural and fee-shifting legislation that the federal
judiciary should facilitate the litigants' and attorneys' participation in federal civil litigation so that they may vindicate constitutional rights and statutory interests, such as the right to be free
from racial or gender discrimination. 811 Thus, to the extent that
judges exercise their discretion in ways which discourage the involvement of these parties and lawyers, the courts are frustrating
congressional intent of those statutes enacted by Congress.Be
In short, numerous federal judges have exercised their discretion in problematic ways. Moreover, there is much evidence that
application of the 1983 amendments has seriously disadvantaged
83. Civil rights plaintiffs have experienced considerably more chilling than other public
interest litigants, such as plaintiffs in environmental litigation. See Tobias, supra note 78,
at 109; Tobias, supra note 5, at 503-06; Tobias, supra note 34, at 17-18. See generally
Vairo, supra note 20, at 200-02. But cf. Maine Audubon Soc'y .v. Purslow, 907 F.2d 265,
268-69 (1st Cir. 1990) (recent example affirming imposition of sanctions on plaintiff in
environmental case).
·
84. See Tobias, supra note 78, at 109. See generally Tobias, supra note 5, at 495-98. Of
course, I am concerned when judicial discretion is improperly exercised against any federal
court litigant; however, the superior resources of some litigants, such as large corporations,
better enable them to protect their interests. Even those litigants may be unwilling to
commit substantial resources to appeals, especially on "questions of principle." For example, two corporations which lost very important inherent authority cases did not file certiorari petitions. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Co., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir.
1989); Eash v. Riggins Trucking Co., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985).
85. See, e.g., Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28
(1988); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). ·
86. The most recent indication of congressional recognition of this dynamic is introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1990. in response to six decisions of the Supreme Court's
1988 •Term which many members of Congress believed violated congressional intent. See
H.R. 4000, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 2104, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). See generally Comment, Reconstruction, Deconstruction and Legislative Response: The 1988 Supreme Court Term and the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 475 (1990).
That legislation did not pass because the Senate failed to override President Bush's veto
by one vote. Lewis, President's Veto of Rights Measure Survives By One Vote, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 25, 1990, at Al, col. 3. Strong, new legislation has been introduced in the 102d
Congress. See H.R. 1, 102d Cong., lat Sess; (1991); New Battle Looming as Democrats
Reintroduce Civil Rights Measure, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1991, at A12, col. 2.
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many litigants, especially parties whose participation Congress
specifically intended to promote. The third section, accordingly,
offers recommendations for the future.
Ill.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The course of action that should be pursued remains quite con-.
troversial. Perhaps the most disputed questions are whether any
of the provisions in amended Rules 11, 16 and 26 should be repealed or revised. Recent developments have made the issues
more controversial. In August 1990, the Advisory Committee issued a call for written comments on the operation of the 1983
amendments, scheduled a hearing for February, 1991, to receive
oral submissions on their application, and stated that the Committee would consider revision thereafter. 87
A. Possible Revision
1.

Rule 11

Numerous observers have argued that Rule 11 should not be
repealed or amended in the near future. Both the Third Circuit
Task Force on Rule 11, which analyzed all Rule 11 activity in that
geographic area during a recent one-year period, 88 and Judge
Schwarzer, a long-time advocate of vigorous Rule 11 enforcement
and a jurist to whom many judges look for guidance in applying
the Rule, 89 have stated that Rule ll's benefits, namely forcing
lawyers to "stop and think" before they file papers, and reducing
litigation abuse, substantially outweigh its disadvantages, such as
chilling civil rights plaintiffs and necessitating expensive satellite
litigation. 90
87. See Call for Comments, supra note 60. See also Labaton, Courts Rethinking Rule
Intended To Slow Frivolous Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1990, at BIS, col. 1.
88. Sees. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK
FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (American Judicature Soc'y 1989).
89. See Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1988) [hereinafter
Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited); see also Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,
103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986); Schwarzer, Sane·
tions Under the New Rule 11: A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985) [hereinafter
Schwarzer, A Closer Look]. Judge Schwarzer is now the Executive Director of the Federal
Judicial Center. Recent examples of cases in which courts have cited Judge Schwarzer's
work include Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990); Lancellotte v.
Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 18, 19 (1st Cir. 1990); Allen v. Utley, 129 F.R.D. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1990).
90. See S. BURBANK, supra note 88, at 95; Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, supra note 89,
at 1014.
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Professor Arthur Miller, who was the Reporter for the Advisory
Committee when the 1983 amendments were promulgated, stated
in July, 1990, that "[i]t would be unfortunate if the decibel level
of the debate over Rule 11 led to its precipitous revision before
sufficient experience accumulated. "91 Professor Miller claimed
that "considerable progress has been made" but urged that "patience is needed," acknowledging that the process of refining Rule
ll's application "will take many more years." 92 Moreover, Professor Melissa Nelken, who has undertaken considerable analysis of
the Rule, recommended in early 1990 that it not be repealed, ofr
fering instead valuable suggestions for amendment that would be
responsive to the needs of civil rights plaintiffs. 93 More recently,
she found that Rule 11 activity in the Northern District of Cali- ·
fornia apparently had numerous positive effects, which accorded
with the rulemakers' expectations, but also had some negative impacts, particularly a "chilling effect on developments in the
law."94
Furthermore, Judge Grady, then-Chair of the Advisory Committee, observed in February, 1990, that there must be additional
study of Rule 11 before modification could be seriously examined.96 Moreover, formal Rule 11 judicial decisionmaking has
been improving generally and for civil rights plaintiffs in particular since approximately the beginning of 1989. 98
Most of the developments above have led me to be more optimistic about Rule ll's application than I was several years ago
when I recommended expeditious repeal. 97 Nevertheless, certain
aspects of Rule 11 enforcement remain sufficiently problematic
91. Miller, The New Certification Standard Under Rule 11, 130 F.R.D. 479, 505 (1990)
(footnote omitted). He found this to be "especially true since there are signs that the
practice under the rule has begun to stabilize and the overly enthusiastic hyperactivity of
the first few years following its promulgation has begun to subside." Id. at 506.
92. Id. at 505.
93. See Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a Middle
Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383 (1990).
94. Nelken, The Impact of Federal Rule 11 on Lawyers and Judges in the Northern
District of California, 74 JUDICATURE 148, 150 (1990). "[T)he sample was too small to
make any generalizations about the rule's impact" on civil rights lawyers. Id. at 152. Professor Nelken's findings are especially important, because many judges in the Northern
District of California have vigorously enforced Rule 11.
95. See Letter from Judge John Grady to Representative Robert Kastenmeier, Chair,
House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property and the Administration of Justice (Feb. 9, 1990) (copy on file with author).
96. See Tobias, supra note 78, at 110-16.
97. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 513-15, 522-24.
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for Civil rights plaintiffs, other litigants and the civil justice system, particularly in contrast with the Rule's rather limited benefits, to warrant prompt amendment of the provision.
Informal Rule 11 activity, such as judicial threats made in
chambers to sanction civil rights plaintiffs, remains especially
troubling. 98 It apparently comprises much of the activity that significantly disadvantages civil rights plaintiffs, and it is the most
difficult to detect. Furthermore, unwarranted and expensive satellite litigation, inconsistent judicial application, and the occasional imposition of large sanctions continue to plague other parties, including some public interest litigants, as well as the civil
litigation process. 99
There currently is ample information to support rational 'determinations about revision of the Rule. For instance, the new version could require a finding that parties or lawyers abused the
litigation process before Rule 11 is contravened or monetary sanctions are imposed. 100
2. Rule 16 and Rule 26
Rule 16's application has generated less debate than Rule 11,
while Rule 26's enforcement has provoked little controversy. Several elements of Rule 16's implementation have afforded benefits,
such as expediting the resolution of disputes. These benefits,
however, are outweighed by several negative factors. Important
considerations are the disadvantages created by formal and informal Rule 16 activity, principally the chilling of parties whose involvement in federal civil litigation Congress sought to foster. Another factor is the possibility of applying measures, such as civil
contempt, which would be less problematic but as effective.
Consequently, those responsible for rule amendment should
now consider some changes. For example, Rule 16 violations
might be limited to serious misbehavior of litigants or lawyers,
while the sanction of attorneys fees could be levied only for egregious· misconduct. 101 An example of conduct which would contravene a revised Rule 16 is the refusal to heed multiple court or98. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30 and text accompanying notes 34-35.
100. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 515-17 (these and additional suggestions for Rule 11
amendment).
101. These recommendations are somewhat similar to suggestions I have made for revising Rule 11. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 515-17.
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ders, even after judges have· granted extensions or issued warnings
that sanctions might be imposed for failure to comply. 102
The enforcement of Rule 26 has yielded benefits .similar to
Rule 16, namely facilitating discovery and the prompt conclusion
of lawsuits. The problems enumerated in the second section, such
as the relatively small number of reported Rule 26 .decisions and
the rather limited information on informal Rule 26 activity, complicate analysis of the Rule's detrimental impact. Nonetheless,
Rule 26's implementation has significantly disadvantaged civil
rights plaintiffs while affording comparatively minimal benefits.
It is appropriate, therefore, to examine revision. The similarity
between the provisions governing rule violations and the imposition of sanctions under Rule 26 and Rule 11 mean that the Advisory Committee should consider changes like those recommended
for Rule 11 and, at least ought to make Rule 26 sanctioning
discretionary.
There is substantial need to modify certain aspects of Rules 11,
16 and 26 immediately. Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee
will not seriously explore amendment until it has evaluated the
results of several Rule 11 studies, the material that was tendered
in response to the Committee's call for' written comments on the
Rules' implementation, and the oral testimony and data submitted at the February, 1991 hearing. It is important, therefore, to
consider the prospect of more study.
B.

Additional Study

Additional study of Rule ll's implementation is not a prerequisite to reasoned decisionmaking about the provision's revision. 108
Considerable data to support informed judgments already exist.
New Rule 11 analyses will requfre the commitment of significant
resources. While such assessments are being conducted, Rule 11
enforcement that is insufficiently solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs will continue to disadvantage them. Moreover, the information that is collected will .not substantially advance present understanding of the Rule's application.
The Federal Judicial Center, at the Advisory Committee's re102. See, e.g., Thompson v. Housing Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 830-31 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 u:s. 829 (1986); Callip v. Harris County Child Welfare Dep't, 757 F.2d 1513, 1516-17,
1522 (5th Cir. 1985); Dukes v. Ward, 129 F.R.D. 478, 481-82 (8.D.N.Y. 1990); cf. Minotti v.
Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1990) (same as to Rule 37).
103. See T. WILLGING. THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS (1988).
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quest, however, has recently finished gathering data on Rule 11
activity since 1987 in five district courts which have fully computerized docket inforn~ation. This effort, which involved a questionnaire on Rule 11 which was circulated to all district judges in the
participating districts, will supplement the relatively recent evaluation conducted under its auspices. 10• Moreover, the American
Judicature Society has commenced an empirical study of Rule 11
activity in the Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits which apparently will be modeled on the earlier work of the Third Circuit
Task Force. 1011 These new endeavors, as well as the information
submitted in response to the Advisory Committee's call for comments, should yield additional valuable material for the use of the
rule revisors as they contemplate Rule ll's amendment.
All of this work and numerous other Rule 11 assessments
should also inform analyses of activity involving Rules 16 and 26.
The Advisory Committee's recent announcement that it may soon
revise Rule 26 and its failure to mention Rule 16, increase the
compelling need to collect, evaluate, and synthesize as much data
as feasible on' the courts' enforcement of the 1983 amendments to
Rule 16 and Rule 26. It is especially important to assemble information on informal implementation and enforcement which has
adversely affected the parties whose involvement Congress meant
to encourage. Certain aspects of these studies, such as precisely
identifying chilling effects and pinpointing litigation and discovery abuses, are quite difficult to complete with the desired accuracy.106 Nonetheless, it is possible to offer numerous suggestions
for future assessments, particularly by drawing on prior evalua-

104. See Studies Examine Rule 11 's Impact, Nat'! L.J., July 30, 1990, at 32, col. 4; see
also Call for Comments, supra note 60. The Center has conducted a preliminary analysis
of the data, and the Advisory Committee asked for refinement of that assessment during
the February 21, 1991 public hearing on Rule 11. Telephone conversation with Thomas
Willging, Deputy Research Director, Federal Judicial Center (Feb. 26, 1991). See generally
PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 30. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky of the University, of
Southern California Law Center also has recently commenced a study of Rule 11 activity
in the Ninth Circuit.
105. See American Judicature Society Rule 11 Project (1990) (copy on file with author);
American Judicature Society Rule 11 Study (Questionnaire) (copy on file with author);
telephone conversation with Professor Bert Kritzer, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, and Co-Director of Rule 11 Project (Mar. 7, 1991).
106. For example, "there are problems of definition, detection and measurement because chilling effects themselves are intangible and amorphous." Tobias, supra note 30, at
177. See also id. at 177-79.
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tions and recommendations for study. 107
· Future work should be as comprehensive and rigorous as possible, focusing on the consequences for civil rights plaintiffs and
other public interest litigants of judicial implementation of Rules
16 and 26. Analysts should systematically gather, assess and synthesize information in enough geographic locales, having sufficiently diverse legal cultures and judicial perspectives on the two
Rules, over adequate time to provide substantial assurance of validity.108 Efforts should be undertaken to determine how many
sanctions requests have been filed and granted against civil rights
plaintiffs and other public interest litigants, the exact amount of
informal Rule 16 and Rule 26 activity that has implicated these
litigants, and the quantity of satellite litigation which has
resulted.
Evaluators should attempt to ascertain whether courts have enforced the two Rules against civil rights plaintiffs with the same
vigor as Rule 11. For example, analogies between Rules 11 and 26
warrant scrutinizing judicial application of Rule 26's requirements governing violations and mandatory sanctions. 109 Assessors
should determine how often courts found that civil rights plaintiffs had contravened Rule 26's reasonable prefiling inquiry command, how many of these cases were close, whether the courts
imposed monetary sanctions, and if so, their magnitude. These
figures should be compared with similar data compiled on Rule
11.
Correspondingly, evaluators examining Rule 16's judicial implementation might attempt to ascertain the relative frequency and
strength with which courts have pressured unwilling litigants and
lawyers, especially civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys, to participate in summary jury trials, settlement negotiations and other
types of alternative dispute resolution. Rule 16, unlike Rules 11
and 26, does not mandate the imposition of sanctions when it is
violated. Accordingly, how often judges have exercised their discretion in levying sanctions and the assessments imposed should
107. See, e.g., S. BURBANK, supra note 88; Tobias, supra note 5; Tobias, supra note 30;
T. WILLGING, supra note 103; see also Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 647, 686-91 (1988) (difficulties of gathering empirical data).
108. See Tobias, supra note 30, at 178.
109. A LEXIS search conducted on May 1, 1991 indicated that judges had issued 10
published opinions involving civil rights and rule 26(g).
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yield helpful insights. no
Rules 16 and 26 provide courts with numerous opportunities to
take informal action, the type of behavior that can most harm
civil rights plaintiffs. 111 It is, therefore, crucial to evaluate this informal activity, which may be more significant than corresponding conduct under Rule 11. For instance, judges can disadvantage
litigants with limited resources when drafting scheduling orders
or encouraging settlement pursuant to Rule 16 or when tailoring
discovery to the needs of the case or to the importance of the
issues at stake under Rule 26. Evaluators should attempt to ascertain how substantially these and similar types of informal activity have discouraged civil rights plaintiffs.
Significant to many of the suggestions presented here will be
the systematic collection, analysis and documentation of information on the informal application of Rules 16 and 26. 112 An important means of assembling these data is to seek the perspectives of
persons, groups and attorneys who contemplated filing, or actually have brought, civil rights actions. After evaluators have gathered and assessed this information, they should be able to ascer. tain with considerable certainty how extensively courts'
enforcement of Rule 16 and Rule 26 has disadvantaged civil
rights plaintiffs and their counsel as well as other litigants, attorneys and the civil justice system.
Assessors should then calculate the advantages of the two
Rules' implementation. For instance, there might be estimates of
how much Rule 26's application has reduced discovery abuse and
the extent to which Rule 16's enforcement has expedited dispute
resolution. Evaluators also should compute the value of the decreased discovery abuse and the more prompt dispute disposition
which have been afforded civil rights plaintiffs, other parties and
the ci.vil litigation process.
Once the benefits and disadvantages above have been compiled,
they should be assigned values. Next, several additional factors
that are not actually benefits or disadvantages should be consulted. One important consideration is Congress' express intent
that civil rights plaintiffs' active involvement in litigation be fa110. A LEXIS search conducted on May l, 1991 indicated that judges had issued 37
published opinions involving civil rights and rule 16(0.
·
111. See Tobias, supra note 30, at 178-79; Tobias, supra note 78, at 117.
112. See Tobias; supra note 78, at 124-26.
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cilitated. 118 This means, for example, that the systemic benefits of
the two Rules' application would have to be substantial before
they could outweigh any significant disadvantages to these plaintiffs. Correspondingly, there should be thorough exploration of alternatives to Rules 16 and 26 that might be equally efficacious
but which have less detrimental impacts on civil rights plaintiffs.
These measures might include state bar ethics requirements and
judicial reliance on civil contempt and case management, or invocation of other sanctioning power under 28 U.S.C. section 1927 or
courts' inherent authority. 114 It also would be helpful to know exactly how much responsibility civil rights plaintiffs bear for discovery abuse and for the delayed disposition of lawsuits.
When all of these considerations have been assembled and valued, it should be possible to achieve some resolution which accommodates the respective needs of civil rights plaintiffs, other
types of litigants and the civil justice system. Congress, the Supreme Court and the Advisory Committee should be able, in turn,
to determine whether additional revision of the 1983 changes in
Rules 16 and 26 that do not govern sanctions is appropriate, and,
if so, how amendment could best be accomplished.

C. Judicial Application of the 1983 Amendments
While the data on Rule 16 and Rule 26 are being gathered and
analyzed, and until Rule 11 is revised, federal courts should enforce the 1983 amendments to all three rules more judiciously.
For example, judges should apply Rule 11 with greater solicitude
for civil rights plaintiffs who are peculiarly susceptible to being
chilled, 1111 a phenomenon that numerous appellate courts have recently recognized. 116
Judges should consider limiting enforcement of the Rule.
Courts could confine Rule 11 violations. to instances of litigation
113. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1477 (1982)). See generally Tobias, supra note 1, at 284-85.
114. For examination of these alternatives, see Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d
866, 870 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988); SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS (G. Joseph, P. Sandler & C. Shaffer 2d ed. 1988); Vairo, supra note 20, at 233.
115. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 513-22.
116. See, e.g., Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1990) (vacating Rule 11 sanction against title VII plaintiff); Kraemer v. Grant County; 892 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir.
1990) (acknowledging Rule ll's chilling effect in civil rights cases involving unpopular clients). See generally Tobias, supra note 78, at 109.
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abuse, as some members of the Third Circuit have suggested. 117
Correspondingly, judges may wish to assess sanctions of attorneys' fees only when parties or lawyers have engaged in egregious
misbehavior. 118
Courts choosing to apply Rule 11 more broadly should remember that civil rights plaintiffs usually lack access to material important for conducting prefiling factual inquiries which appear
reasonable and often plead legal theories which are not traditional. Concomitantly, if judges find that these parties have contravened Rule 11, the courts should levy the "least severe sanction" necessary. 119 They also should keep in mind numerous nonmonetary options, which include a "warm, friendly discussion on
the record, a hard-nosed reprimand in open court [and] compulsory legal education.m 2 o
All of these suggestions pertain equally to Rule 26 provisions
analogous to those in Rule 11, and to parts of Rule 26 which are
dissimilar. For instance, judges applying the Rule 26(b)(l) criteria
to requests that civil rights plaintiffs' discovery be limited as unduly burdensome should remember that these plaintiffs typically
seek non-monetary, declaratory or injunctive relief, frequently attempt to vindicate significant constitutional rights and statutory
interests of many non-parties, and generally have limited resources for doing so. 121
Correspondingly, courts enforcing Rule 16 should not invoke it
to demand that unwilling litigants participate in summary jury
trials, settlement negotiations, or additional alternatives to dispute resolution, especially in lawsuits implicating important public values. 122 Moreover, when civil rights plaintiffs have violated
the Rule, judges should seriously consider exercising their discre117. See, e.g., Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194
(3d Cir. 1988); Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1988).
118. Egregious misconduct is activity that exceeds serious misbehavior. See, e.g., supra
note 102 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Schwarzer, A Closer Look, supra note 89, at 201; Thomas v. Capital Sec.
Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988); Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466-67 (4th Cir.
1987).
120. Thomas, 836 F.2d at 878.
121. The court shall limit discovery if it is "unduly burdensome or expensive" considering the "needs of the case ... limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of
the issues at stake in the litigation." FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(l). See generally supra text
accompanying notes 81-84.
122. See Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 668, 679-80 (1986); Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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tion not to sanction. Courts also must avoid applying either Rule
16 or 26 informally in ways that dampen these litigants'
enthusiasm.
Courts should keep in mind as well that many observers, including numerous members of Congress, consider the public values that civil rights plaintiffs attempt to vindicate more important than the prompt resolution of lawsuits. 123 Indeed, the federal
judiciary must temper its concerns about case dispositions to the
apparent exclusion of practically all else, including congressional
intent. If the courts fail to do so, the litigation explosion appears
destined to drive all discretionary procedural decisionmaking in
ways that promise to impoverish procedural discourse and which
could lead to a confrontation with Congress.

D. Congress,

the

Supreme

Court

and. the

Advisory

Committee
Ample, troubling ·evidence regarding Rule 11 's enforcement
warrants its immediate repeal or modification. The Advisory
Committee, with the information gleaned from responses to its
call for comments, the February, 1991 hearing and the data derived from the Rule 11 studies which have recently been completed, should be able to expeditiously draft proposed language
repealing or altering Rule 11 for Supreme Court and congressional consideration. If the Committee and the Court do not suggest the repeal or modification of the provision, Congress may
want to change the Rule independently. Congress, however, has
been relatively reluctant to act independently, apparently out of
deference to Advisory Committee expertise and concern for the
inter-branch, cooperative nature of the rules revision process, involving delicate relationships between Congress and the Court. 124
123. See, e.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1302-04 (1976); Fiss, supra note 122, at 1086-87; Tobias, supra note 1, at 337. Congress has recently evinced increased interest in expediting dispute resolution. See, e.g.,
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (provision of Judicial Improvement Act of 1990 calling for civil justice expense and delay reduction plans); 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988) (provisions of Judicial Improvements and Access
to Justice Act of 1988 calling for court-annexed arbitration).
124. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 293, 337-40. But cf. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act
of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1018-20 (1982) (documenting increased congressional willingness since 1973 to intercept proposed rules and amendments governing evidence and ·
civil, criminal, and appellate procedure). See generally Friedenthal, The Rulemaking
Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975).
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The rule-amending authorities should explore the possibility of
revising certain aspects of the sanctioning provision included in
Rule 26, particularly its mandatory character, as well as the sanctioning provision in Rule 16. The amendment of additional portions of the two Rules that were changed in 1983 may have to
await the collection, analysis, and synthesis of more data on their
application.
Congress should do everything possible to promote the necessary studies of Rules 16 and 26. It should provide the requisite
resources and encourage assessments by governmental organizations, such as the Federal Judicial Center, and expert, impartial
entities outside the government, such as the American Judicature
Society.
Congress should also consider exploring whether the 1983
amendments have ceded excessive discretion to the judiciary, discretion that has been exercised in ways which frustrate congressional intent. Insofar as courts' enforcement of the 1983 revisions
has chilled civil rights plaintiffs, the implementation has undermined congressional intent evidenced in substantive, procedural,
and fee-shifting legislation that such parties' participation be facilitated. If Congress finds that judicial application has eroded
this intent, as it did with numerous Supreme Court rulings of the
1988 Term, Congress could pass remedial procedural legislation
analogous to the Civil Rights Act of 1990. 1211 Indeed, Congress
should broadly analyze whether the courts have invoked procedural provisions in a manner that frustrates its intent in substantive civil rights, and other, laws. Were Congress to conduct such a
survey, it would discover that many judges implement procedures
in ways which frustrate congressional intent and that this application requires correction. 126
CONCLUSION

The 1983 amendments to Federal Rules 11, 16 and 26 were an
experiment that considerably enhanced the federal judiciary's
discretion. Numerous courts have enforced the new provisions in
ways which detrimentally affect many litigants, especially civil
125. See Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural Legislation (1991) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author); supra note 86 and accompanying text for discussion of recent congressional efforts.
126. See Tobias, Access, Excess, Congress (1991) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
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rights plaintiffs whose involvement in federal civil litigation Congress clearly intended to promote. Judicial application of revised
Rule 11 has been sufficiently problematic to warrant prompt repeal or amendment. Moreover, the sanctioning requirements included in revised Rules 16 and 26 should be changed soon. It is
unclear whether the remaining provisions of the two Rules that
were amended in 1983 should be modified. Consequently, collection, analysis and synthesis of additional data on their implementation ought to proceed. Once that. work is concluded, the Advisory Committee, the Supreme Court and Congress should be able
to ascertain whether amendment is indicated.

